This study investigates the effects of relationship lending on firm innovativeness using a panel of Italian manufacturing firms. In order to disentangle the impact of bank ties on the discovery phase from that in the introduction phase of new technologies, the analysis proceeds in two steps, estimating two distinct equations for each phase. As there are conflicting theoretical predictions on the effects of the various sources of funding in the different stages of the innovative process, this study provides results for small and high-tech firms, so as to account for firm heterogeneity. Results suggest that for small firms, banks do not carry out an intervention at the stage of development of new technologies, playing their traditional role of financing investments of constrained firms. Differently, relationship banks do play an important role in both phases for high-tech firms.
Introduction
As the fourth Community Innovation Survey highlighted, for the majority of European firms the main obstacle inhibiting innovation is represented by financial factors. Firm's financial need, however, is not constant and varies in relation to firm characteristics (e.g., a firm in a hightech sector) as well as project phases (e.g., the development stage of an innovation). Lacking the visibility of more established firms, young and small firms are likely to suffer even more for the financing of their investments because of asymmetric information problems (Berger and Udell (1998) ). Moreover, the different phases of a project are characterized by different degree of risk.
Despite theoretical works have already emphasized complex links between finance and innovation (e.g., O' Sullivan (2004) ; de la Fuente and Marin (1996) ), and notwithstanding current richness of enterprise-based innovation surveys, there is little in the existing empirical micro-economic literature on the functions of the various sources of funding across different innovation phases. Relying on a panel of Italian manufacturing firms, the main objective of this paper is to fill this gap by studying the effects of relationship lending -that is, close ties between borrowers and banks -in two different phases of an innovative process: the 'discovery phase', which captures firm financial needs related to the development of an innovation, and the 'introduction phase', which depicts financial needs associated with bringing products to the market. As Italian firms have strongly relied on relationship banking to finance investments, focusing on these firms allows to isolate the role of bank-firm relationship in fostering innovation.
In order to disentangle the effects of bank ties on the discovery phase from those in the phase of introduction and adoption of new technologies, and to master firm financial need related to these phases, the following analysis proceed in two steps, first measuring firm propensity to innovate in the discovery phase, and then by estimating firm intensity to innovate in the introduction phase.
From the econometric perspective, it means to adopt a generalised tobit model which accounts for the fact that firms are either innovative or not, and among the innovative firms, the extent to which they are so by measuring the percentage of new products in total sales (Mohnen et al. (2006) ). This strategy has several advantages. Firstly, it allows to distinguish in which phases of an innovative project a relationship bank may play a role. Distinguishing between invention and introduction of new technologies is also important in the light of firm innovation patterns, as firms may tend to absorb innovations from outside than in carrying out research. Finally, it allows to control for problems of selection and endogeneity due to firm unobserved characteristics. More precisely, I begin with adopting a cross-section Tobit (type II), to keep selectivity problems under control, to then turn on panel estimators, to control for endogeneity problems as well. In recent years, a number of panel estimators have been suggested for sample selection models where both the selection equation and the equation of interest contain individual effects which are correlated with explanatory variables (Raymond et al. (2007) , Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007) ).
In particular, I will rely on the estimator proposed by Rochina-Barrachina (1999) which extend Heckman's two step estimator deriving an expression for the selectivity correction term for two different time periods.
As the empirical determinants of relationship lending have been already investigated in the literature (e.g., Elsas (2005) ), I will only describe its key determinants so as to focus on the reasons why bank ties should affect firm innovative capacity. To get a complete picture, since the dataset also offers indications on the other type of financing, I will take into account other sources of finance available to the firms, as well as the role of public incentives. Since banks are by far the most important source of external finance in Italy, it is reasonable to expect the internal sources to play a crucial role in financing innovation. Another important peculiarity of the banking system is its delimitation in local areas, in Italy corresponding to 103 provinces, which are geographical units similar to US counties (Guiso et al. (2004 (Guiso et al. ( , 2006 ; Colombo and Turati (2004) ). The geographical segmentation is relevant in order to identify the level at which competition indicators, which are important control variables in the present analysis, have to be computed.
Closely related to this analysis are the works of Benfratello et al. (2007) and Herrera and Minetti (2007) . However, it departs from Benfratello et al. (2007) for having a deeper look at the effects on innovation of specific bank-firm ties (such as the duration), distinguishing the discovery from the introduction phase, instead of focusing on the level of financial development. With respect to the work of Herrera and Minetti (2007) , the methodology adopted is substantially different.
These authors in fact investigated the possibility of endogeneity of the relationship variables while estimating the probability of introducing innovation. In this work, the method of estimation will account for this problem, considering in addition different innovation phases as well as other important variables that in their work have been neglected. In particular, the effects of intensity of fixed capital and R&D investment, as well as the role of internal sources of financing, in the probability of being innovative.
The paper is structured in the following way. The next section gives an overview of the literature while section 3, after a brief description of the empirical determinants of relationship lending, explores its possible links with firm innovativeness. Section 4 presents the dataset and the main descriptive statistics on the degree of firm innovativeness. Section 5 presents the model, which distinguishes the introduction and discovery phases of innovation, and results for a cross-section of firms using data from the ninth Capitalia survey. On the contrary, section 6 and 7 presents a deeper analysis relying on panel data estimators for the discovery phase and introduction phase respectively. The final section summarizes the paper.
Literature review
A lively macro-economic debate on the role of financial architecture in fostering innovation and technology is the one on the bank-based versus market-based system (i.e., Carlin and Mayer (2003) , Levine (2002) ). Are bank-based systems at the advantage in processing information particularly relevant for firms' incentive to innovate? The available evidence is rather mixed but findings suggest that market-based systems do not dominate bank-based systems and vice-versa in all times.
However, knowledge-intensive industries, with soft, hard-to-monitor complex activities seem to get on better in bank-based financial systems (Tadesse (2007) ).
Even though researchers have argued theoretically, and tested empirically, that there is a link between finance and innovation, there is still little in the existing micro-economic literature about the functions of the various sources of funding in the different phases of innovation (O' Sullivan (2004) ). The main contribution of this paper is to make another step in this direction, enhancing the understanding of the role played by bank ties in the phases of invention and introduction of new technologies.
In fact, this paper relates to two, somehow separated, strands of empirical literature. The first comprises articles on the economics of innovation. During the past decade, a number of countries in Europe have implemented enterprise-based surveys of innovative activity (i.e., Community Innovation Survey (CIS)). At the same, important progress has been made in modeling appropriate econometric methods for innovation survey data (Raymond et al. (2007) ). Hall and Mairasse (2006) provide an interesting review of the empirical studies on innovation.
The second strand mainly relates to works investigating bank-firm relationship. Since there is a vast literature on this topic, here I only refer to works related to the Italian banking system. For a review, see Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) and Degryse and Ongena (2008) . Some of these works investigate the credit access for firms belonging to industrial districts. Relying on the ninth Capitalia survey, Ughetto (2006) and Rotondi (2005) show that Italian firms in industrial districts are less likely to be credit rationed. In particular, Alessandrini et al. (2008) evidence that the incidence of relationship lending for firms in industrial districts is not significantly different from the average. Ferri and Messori (2000) show that arm's length patterns prevail in the Northwest, the area of oldest industrialization with larger banks and firms, whereas relationship-banking patterns prevail in the rest of the country, populated to a larger extent by smaller banks and firms.
Only a few works have investigated -at micro level -how the decisions to invest in innovation are affected by firm capacity to raise the necessary financial means to realise an innovative project. Benfratello et al. (2007) find strong evidence that banking development has a significant and important effect on process innovation and a weaker for product innovation. In addition, they find that banking development has lessened the severity of financing constraints faced by small firms. Herrera and Minetti (2007) test the impact on innovation of the information of the main bank -proxied by the duration of credit relationship. They observe that firms with longer credit relationships have a higher probability to innovate. Furthermore, the length of the relationship seems to foster the acquisition of new technologies rather than internal research.
Using a large panel of US companies, Atanassov et al. (2007) explore the relationship between arm's length financing and innovation taking patents as a measure of innovative output. They found that firms that relied more on arm's length financing are associated with a larger number of patents. They also conclude that innovative firms choosing their capital structure mainly drive this correlation. Relying on firm-level data from a survey conducted in Finland, but looking instead at the role of public policy, the work of Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) provides evidence that capital-market imperfections delay innovation, and government funding disproportionately helps firms in industries that are more dependent on external finance. They used as a measure of firm innovativeness the level of R&D expenditure.
None of these works, however, has investigated how financial sources act on firm incentives to innovate as well as on the effective realization of innovation projects in products for the market.
Relationship lending and firm innovativeness
In this section, in order to identify the main variables to be used in the empirical analysis, first, I will briefly describe the key determinants of relationship lending. Then, I will investigate the reasons why relationship lending should affect the phases of innovation. For a detailed description of the empirical determinants of relationship lending see Elsas (2005) , whereas for an analytical survey on the effects of relationship lending on the pricing of loans, as well as its effect on the degree of competition see Freixas (2005) .
Determinants of relationship lending
Relationship lending represents the informational privilege that a bank accumulates over time by establishing close ties with its borrower (Ongena and Smith (2001) ). Reflecting the idea that long tenure depicts the relationship intensity, the most commonly proxy for relationship lending is the duration of a bank-borrower relationship. The exclusivity of bank relationship is also regarded as an indicator of close ties between the bank and the borrower. In this regards, the number of bank relationships should capture the possibility for bank to realize the economic benefit associated with the relationship. A negative correlation between the number of banks and the development of relationship lending is reasonable. Finally, a higher debt financing share should increase the likelihood of relationship lending.
Credit concentration has also been identified as an important determinant of bank-firm ties ). Asymmetric or concentrated borrowing may in fact play a role in balancing the hold-up problem of relationship lending. Unfortunately, Capitalia survey does not provide such information.
Relationship lending and innovation
In Italy relationship lending has always been a way to channel funds to productive investments.
In fact, despite its development, the stock market does not play a crucial role, while specialized financiers play a marginal role. In 2004, in the comparison between the Italian and the European venture capital industry -in term of venture capital and private equity instruments over GDPItaly ranked 12th, with all other large European economies ranking well above. In addition, the Italian venture capital industry is focused on later-stage investments: on average, in 2004, early stage financing represented only 2% of total investments in Italy compared with 6.4% in Europe (Gregoriou et al. (2006) ). Banks, in particular, turned out to be better suited to finance innovation embodied in physical capital rather than technological progress (Ughetto (2007) ). As Italian firms typically do not receive external equity, internal equity finance (auto-financing/cashflow) represented an important source of innovation financing as well. Capitalia survey shows that, in [2001] [2002] [2003] , for 83% of firms auto-financing still represents the main source to finance innovation, followed by 10% of firms relying more on public incentives, and 5% on banks loans.
In which way then, relationship lending affects firm innovative capacity? Can it mitigate firm resort to internal finance? What makes a relationship lender special in fostering innovation?
The theoretical connections between innovation and relationship lending are diverse (Bertocco (2008) ). Different arguments point out that investments in R&D activities are different from investments in capital goods. First, R&D projects may not be easily understood by outsiders and create large intangible assets which cannot be used as a collateral (Hall (2002) ). In addition, expected returns of R&D are uncertain and difficult to estimate. As suggested by Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) , firms may also be reluctant to finance externally their R&D projects for strategic reasons.
In addition to have a direct effect on the quantity of R&D and investment spending, however, banks may affect the nature of the selected projects, the quality of internal inputs as well as their effectiveness in generating innovation. In the introduction phase, a relationship bank may also help the firm in selecting the appropriate distributional channels of the innovative products.
As Boot (2000) argues, relationship banking goes beyond lending and includes other services as well. In this regard, relationship lending leaves room for flexibility and discretion allowing the utilization of non-contractible information and addressing contractual features that are possibly unique. Furthermore, the firm can disclose information to the relationship bank without worrying about it divulges over competitors. Finally, bank ability to offer multi-period contracts, which are much more effective than one-shot contracts (i.e. transactions) in extracting information, may be helpful in the allocation process and the mechanisms that allow firms to make commitments of resources to innovative activities, notwithstanding the challenges of doing so.
On the other hand, close and durable relationships may also involve inefficiencies, mainly related to the hold-up and soft-budget-constraint problems. The hold-up problem refers to the possibility that relationship banks may extract rents, thus causing inefficient investment choices and reducing available resources for innovative projects (see von Thadden (1995) , and for a review Allen and Carletti (2008) ), whereas the soft-budget-constraint problem concerns the bank's incentive to refinance some of the ex-post inefficient projects in order to recoup past investments (Dewatripont and Roland (2000) , and for a review Kornai et al. (2003) ).
As there are conflicting predictions, and the empirical research has lagged theoretical development, in the following empirical investigation it seems therefore crucial to account for firm heterogeneity (small vs. large, and low-tech vs. high-tech) in order to identify and differentiate the effects of relationship lending on firm capacity to innovate in relation to firm characteristics.
Data description
The data used in this work are obtained by the two most recent waves -the 8th and the 9th -of the comprehensive survey on Italian manufacturing firms carried out by Capitalia (and previously by Mediocredito Centrale) every three years. These surveys are conducted through questionnaires, administered to a representative sample of manufacturing firms within the national borders. The sample is stratified with references to the number of employees, goods/services sectors and geographical area. Throughout the analysis I will rely on the provided sampling weights to extend results to the overall population of Italian manufacturing firms, and to avoid inaccurate estimates and standard errors. Questionnaires collected information over the previous three years (1998-2000 and 2001-2003) and, for the majority of the firms, are supplemented with standard balance sheet data.
1 The 8th and the 9th survey include respectively 4,289 and 4,497 firms. To broaden the sample period of the analysis, I merged these two waves and obtained a reduced sample of 2,097
firms. This sample includes only those firms existing in both surveys and therefore with potentially complete observations over the 1998-2003 period. I further excluded firms with incomplete information to get a final sample of 1,221 observations. I will progressively use the panel structure of the data in order to check and address the endogeneity problems: in the next section I will present result for a cross-section of firms surveyed in the ninth wave, whereas in the following sections I will rely on both surveys performing panel data estimations.
Based on this sample, table (1) reports the population percentages (and standard errors) of firms with either product or process innovation. The most important information is the increasing percentage of innovative firms, across size and sectors, over the period considered. These higher percentages reflect the higher number of firms doing R&D. As table (2) shows, particularly in high-tech industries, the majority of firms are involved in R&D activities. This is even more visible for larger firms where this percentage reached 80% in high-tech sectors.
2 Table ( 3) reports the (population) mean of the variables measuring relationship lending for the period 2001 are no significant differences in the duration of the relationship with the main bank, in the bank main share, and in the number of lending banks between small low-tech and high-tech firms, as well as for large low-tech and high-tech firms. There are significant differences when comparing these values according to the size variable. Interesting to note, however, is that there are no significant differences for small and large high-tech firms in the mean value of the variables related to the main bank (duration and share).
1 The principal information contained in the questionnaire concerns: general news on the company, its ownership, controlling interests, and membership of groups, workforce, investment activities, technological innovation, research and development, internationalisation, commercial and competitive channels, finance. The dataset does not provide information on bank characteristics. See Survey of manufacturing enterprises http://www.unicredit-capitalia.eu 2 According to NACE classification, firms where classified as in:
-low-tech sectors: textile, wood, food, plastic, paper, coke, non metallic and nec (not elsewhere classified).
-high-tech sectors: vehicles, machinery and chemicals
The empirical model and results
I adopt a generalized (Type 2) Tobit model consisting of two equations, where the first one is a probit equation determining whether a firm innovates or not ("propensity to innovate"), and the second one is a linear regression (the Tobit equation or "intensity to innovate") explaining how much the firm innovates (Mohnen et al. (2006) ). I will measure firm propensity to innovate by means of a dummy variable equal to one when new processes and products are introduced into the market, whereas the firm intensity to innovate can be measured by the share of innovative sales in total sales. One way to interpret this latter variable is to think of it as measuring the 'novelty'
or the 'success' of the innovation. The more break through the innovation, the more revenues it is likely to generate. In this case, it is not obvious that the intensity to innovate equation is capturing a different stage. However, the share of innovates sales in total corporate sales is also determined by firm capacity to 'market' its products. The higher the firm ability to bring its new products to the market, the higher the share coming from innovative products (despite the intrinsic novelty of the innovation). In fact, contrary to other type of surveys (i.e, Community Innovation Survey -CIS), I
am not able to distinguish between innovative sales corresponding to products new to the firm but possibly known to the market, which can be considered imitations of product already produced by other competitors, and those corresponding to products only new to the market, which can be regarded as true innovations. In this sense, the intensity to innovate equation may capture a firm ability in a distinct phase of the innovative process, in which again a relationship bank may play an important role (e.g. the choice of distribution or marketing channels).
Denoting by d i the binary variable indicating if firm i is an innovating firm -that is, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm either has introduced at least one product or process innovation -I can write
where 3 All the analysis were also performed replacing SIZE with its logarithm and including a dummy equal to 1 for firms included in a group. Results with the log of size do not change significantly, whereas the group dummy variable did not turn out to be significant.
−∞ to +∞. Thus I can write our second equation as
or equivalently
where
x i is a vector of explanatory variables, b 2 is a vector of parameters to be estimated and u i > 0 is an error term reflecting omitted variables. Since I have data on sale growth for the majority of the firms in the panel, I exploit the panel structure of the data in order to exclude the variable past sales growth [g_sales t−1 ] from the explanatory variables I have in x i , and to include it in z i .
This variable in fact can be a determining factor of innovation, as reflecting stronger demand and easier internal and external access to finance (Mohnen et al. (2006) ). 4 Moreover, relying on past sales growth as exclusionary variable allows me to account for firm internal sources. I also present some results using as exclusionary variable [rationed t−1 ], a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm answered to be credit rationed in the previous survey. Results are substantially equals.
However, g_sales t−1 seems more reliable since it based on balance sheet data -instead of being determined by firm self assessment -offering at the same time indications on the role of internal sources.
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Assuming that e and u are bivariate normal with zero mean, and σ e = 1, I can estimate the model as a generalized Tobit (type 2) model using STATA Heckman procedure for survey analysis.
Therefore, estimates will not refer to the sample but to the population of Italian firms. Preliminary results for the model without considering any financial variables are reported in table (4). Table   4 Balance sheet information is an important feature of this database. The growth of sales is in fact a reasonable exclusionary variable if we think that innovation phases are sequential, and this variable will 'directly' affect the available resources to develop new products in the current year but only 'indirectly' the resources available to market these new products (once developed). 5 More precisely, firms are defined to be credit rationed if answer yes to all the following question: 1. whether at the current market interest rate they wish a larger amount of credit; 2. whether they would be willing to accept a small increase in the interest rate charged in order to obtain more credit3. whether they have applied for credit but have been turned down by the financial intermediary. That means, SMEs that are in need of (external) capital are more likely to pursue some innovations and positively affected by long-term relationship with some banks. To account for this possibility, and to control how it will affect the role of bank relationship in fostering innovation, table (6) also reports results for relationship variables interacted with a dummy variable for SMALL firms. At 1% level, a higher share of the major lending bank will have a positive effects on the capacity of small firms to translate innovation into a greater percentage of firm sales stemming from innovative products, and at 5% level it will have a positive effect on the probability of introducing an innovation. On the other hand, contrary to what have been found by Herrera and Minetti (2007) , longer relationship may have counter positive effect on firm capacity to innovate. However, the overall effect on both the capacity and intensity to innovate for small firms is not significant. These results are robust and reinforced if the exclusionary variable [g_sales t−1 ] is replaced by a dummy variable for firms being credit rationed in the previous survey (not reported).
Relationship lending and external finance
Relying on the same set of variables used in the previous section, and by further exploiting the panel structure of the data, in this section I will estimate the previous model by identifying industries'
technological demand for external finance. The reason for bringing into the picture this variable is related to the necessity to control for some specific industry features which may affect both the firm capacity to innovate and the role of bank ties.
In order to do that, following Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) is that there are technological reasons why some industries rely more on external finance than others (i.e, gestation periods of products, the initial project scale, the cash harvest period). It seems important therefore to look how these 'intrinsic' industry features may affect bank ties, and ultimately firm capacity to innovate. It is reasonable to think that the effects of relationship lending variables should vary with the needs of external capital: the more firms are dependent on external finance, the stronger the ties with banks, and the higher the effects on firm innovativeness.
However, it would be risky to assume that industry demands for external financing in Italy will be the same of large listed US firms. Shifting the focus to between industry differences, therefore, I will measure external finance dependence using firm-level variables as collected during the eight Capitalia survey. As in Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) , I estimate the measure of external finance, using a financial planning model (called also the percentage of sales approach, see Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002)). This index, denoted by EF N , measures the proportion of firms whose annual growth rate of sales exceeds the maximum growth rate that can be financed if a firm relies only on its internal resources and maintain its dividend. Those firms whose actual mean growth rates are above the maximum one are assumed to be in need of external finance. 7 For each firm in the sample I compare its actual growth rate with the maximum growth rate that can be financed if a firm relies only on its internal resources and maintains its dividend. Then, I compute for each industry (according to NACE classification) the proportion of firms in financial needs, that is those firms whose mean actual growth rate is above the mean maximum attainable. To check the robustness of the measure, I also compute the same percentage, EF N , assuming that firms does not pay dividend and obtain just enough debt financing to maintain a constant ratio of total debt to assets (implicitly also a summing that the firm does not issue equity or increase leverage). These measure are conservative in three ways. First, each maximum growth assumes that a firm utilizes the
The main advantage of computing this index is to (partially) control also for reverse causality.
As pointed out by Herrera and Minetti (2007) , measures such as the length of the relationship might be endogenous to the innovation process. The econometric specification chosen, already accounts for selectivity problem, as the significance level of ρ coefficient in the various specification indeed points out. Since the measure of external financial dependence is computed at industry level (NACE classifications), and using data from the eight survey, the introduction of such an industry-level measure, in interaction with firm relationship lending variables, should therefore account for the possibility that firms in some industries tend to have on average longer/shorter ties with lending banks.
Results are reported in table (7) using the ROE version of the EF N index. In the first two columns, the variable EF N is simply added to the basic model. In the last column of table (7), EF N is introduced also in interaction with relationship lending variables (measured at firm level).
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From that analysis two points deserve a remark. First of all, the coefficient on EF N is negative and significant in both equations, suggesting that firms that grow faster, and which are more in need of external finance, might find difficult to finance their innovation and bring new products to the market. This result is in line with CIS survey results which highlighted that for the majority of the Italian firms the main obstacles inhibiting innovation is still represented by financial factors.
Secondly, the length of the relationship and the number of lending banks become significantrespectively at 6% and 10% level -in the propensity to innovate equation. In particular, they have a negative effect on the probability of introducing an innovation in those sectors that are more in financial need. Even in this case, results are not affected if the exclusionary variable g_sales t−1 is replaced by a dummy variable for firms being credit rationed in the previous survey. Broadly, these results suggest that a relationship bank may play an important role for developing an innovation for firm with greater external financial need (i.e. bank share interaction is positive whereas the number of banks interaction is negative), although it may have counter positive effects when this unconstrained sources of finance no more intensively that it is currently doing. Second, firms with spare capacity do not need to invest and may grow at a faster rate than predicted by the model. Third, the financial planning model abstract from technical advancement that reduce the requirements for investment capital. Thus it may overstate the cost of growth and underestimate the maximum growth rate attainable using unconstrained sources of finance Maksimovic (2002, 1998) ) 8 In these regressions, to avoid problem of collinearity I remove sectoral dummies as the EF N index is computed at industry level, though at a more disaggregated level. See also Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
relationship becomes longer (i.e. the length interaction is negative).
Despite the interest of these cross-section regressions, however, I must be careful before drawing any straightforward conclusion as I have to control for a set of variables and take care of econometric problems arising from firm unobserved heterogeneity in the intensity to innovate equation as well.
In the next paragraph I will look at banking market characteristics whereas in the next section I will present more refined econometric estimations.
Bank competition and innovation
The level of competition among banks represents a factor which may either strengthen or weaken firm ties with the bank. On the one hand, there are theories that argue that competition and relationships are incompatible since banks may not enjoy the possibilities to extract profit later on in the relationship (Petersen and Rajan (1995) ). On the other hand, other theories argue that more competition may instead increase relationship lending, allowing banks to mitigate the effects of fiercer competition extracting higher rents (Boot (2000) ; Boot and Thakor (2000) ). Empirical works indeed suggest that competition and relationship lending are not necessary inimical (Degryse and Ongena (2007) , Elsas (2005) ).
In order to bring this element into the analysis, I will compute an index of banking competition at provincial level. The Italian territory is divided into 20 regions and 103 provinces, which are geographical units similar to US counties. In accordance with the Italian Antitrust Authority, the presumption is that the province is the relevant market. More specifically, I will include among regressors the number of bank branches per squared kilometer [BAN K_COM P ] in each province.
The branch density represents the monopolistic power of each branch and could be considered as a proxy of the (inverse of) transportation costs. More branches in the same provinces means, for each consumer, a lower distance to cover to reach a branch, a weaker power exerted by bank branch and an overall higher degree of competition (Degryse and Ongena (2005) ).
BAN K_COM P is a measure similar to the one propose by Benfratello et al. (2007) , the number of branches per habitants. 9 In addition to that index, I also consider a traditional of measure of market concentration, represented by sum of the market share of the first three banks
[CH3]. Even in this case, I will focus on local markets by measuring market shares at the provincial level using data on branches as proxies for the market share of individual (or group of) banks.
However, one must be cautious in interpreting this measure as a proxy of banking competition.
As Claessens and Laeven (2004) show, variables describing the banking system structure may not be good summary statistics for bank competitive environment. Conversely, these authors found that more concentrated banking system face a greater degree of competition. In this case, BAN K_COM P and CH3 are negatively correlated (ranging from -0.02 to -0.63 across regions, average -0.42). is instead jointly significant with the EF N index at 5% level. This result suggests that less concentrated credit markets might foster innovation (Spagnolo (2004) ). It is also interesting to see how that variable interacts with the external financial need. Results are reported in the last two columns of table (8). The relationship is negative and significant both equations. However, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the overall effect in the discovery phase is zero. No significant interactions have been found between relationship lending variables and competition variables (not reported).
Relationship lending in the discovery phase
Relying on the same set of (time-varying) variables used in the previous section, and by completely exploiting the panel structure of the data, in this section I will focus on the effects of bank ties in the discovery phase only, in order to better control for endogeneity issues.
Given that I only have two observations about the introduction of innovation (in the eight and ninth survey), it is not possible to fully address the endogeneity problems and to identify causal links. However, since one fundamental problem is to control for unobserved firm characteristics that are constant over time, the conditional logit model will work properly. Conditional logit models eliminate the firm specific effects, but only switchers (that is, firms that introduced an innovation in just one of the two sub-periods) contribute to the likelihood function. Therefore, I can rely on a restricted number of observations, as only around 40% of the sample is made up of switchers and not all the explanatory variables are observed for all firms in both periods. I cannot control for another potential source of endogeneity caused by technological shock that leads, for example, to an increase both in the probability of observing an innovation and in the research intensity (Parisi et al. (2006) ).
As in the previous analysis, relationship lending variables turned out to be significant in explaining the probability of introducing process or product innovations. In the model presented in table (9), they are jointly significant at 5% level. The most important result is again the role played by the share of the main bank. However, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the overall effect for small firms is equal to zero. Banks do not seem play a crucial role in the discovery phase for small firms. In the second column of table (9) small firms computed at the mean level of the regressors. For the average small firm the share of the main bank turned out to be negative and significant, suggesting that for small firms having a relationship bank may also have a negative effect on the capacity to introduce an innovation.
In addition, in table (10), I repeat the same analysis but distinguishing the effects for high-tech and low-tech firms. Again, relationship variables are jointly significant at 5% level. Looking at high-tech firms, then, it seems that bank might play a crucial role also in the introduction phase. In particular, for high-tech firms, also the length of the relationship proved to be a relevant variable.
The baseline results from column (2) suggest that longer relationship might have a negative effect for low-tech firms (and a positive although not significant for high-tech firms). Table (12) reports marginal effects for hight-tech firms computed at the mean levels. A higher share of the main bank in total banking debt increases the probability of being innovative by 0.3% compared to low-tech firms. Despite the magnitude of the coefficients is not high, the economic significance of these results can be understood by looking at the different effects compared to small firms. For high-tech firms, it clearly emerges the positive role of a relationship bank in fostering innovation (with a positive a significant effect of the main bank share and the length of the relationship), whereas the opposite is true for small firms (with a negative a significant effect of the share of the main bank).
Moreover, by looking at columns (2') of the marginal effect tables -where marginal effects have been computed for firms not involved in R&D or fixed capital investments -also the length of the relationship turned out to be positive and individually significant.
Tests of the conditional models confirm at 5% level the presence of fixed effects for small firms, whereas this hypothesis can be rejected for high-tech firms. For small firms, therefore, results from the conditional model are robust to correlation of regressors with firm fixed effects in contrast to the cross-section analysis. These results, however, are in line with the cross-section analysis, suggesting that banks do not play a crucial role in the discovery phase for small firms. Overall, these regressions confirm the importance of bank ties in affecting firm innovative capacity, even though this is particularly true for firms in high-tech sectors. Then, in line with the results of Herrera and Minetti (2007) , it is possible to conclude that for small firms, banks do not carry out a sophisticated intervention at the stage of assessment and development of new technologies. For high-tech firms, instead, banks do play an important role in the discovery phase.
Relationship Lending in the introduction phase
In this section I will rely on a panel estimator in order to investigate the role of bank ties in the introduction phase by estimating a selection model where both the selection and regression equation may contain individual effects which are correlated with explanatory variables. In recent years a number of panel estimators have been suggested for these type of models (Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007) , Raymond et al. (2007) ). In particular, I will use the two-step estimators approach proposed by Rochina-Barrachina (1999) which extend Heckman's sample selection technique developed in section 5 to the case where one correlated selection rule in two different time periods generated the sample. By nothing that for a firm which is innovative in two time periodsand therefore has been selected into the second stage estimation -this estimator eliminates the firm effects from the equation of interest (3) by taking time differences, and then condition upon the outcome of the selection process being "one" (observed) in the two periods (Rochina-Barrachina (1999) ). This leads to two correction terms the form of which depends upon the assumption made about the selection process and the joint distribution of unobservables. With consistent estimates of these corrections terms, simple least squares can be used to obtain consistent estimates in the second step.
More precisely, the estimated equation is now given by,
where the subscript refers to time 1 and 2, and λ 1 and λ 2 are the two corrections terms.
To construct estimates of the λ terms a bivariate probit of equation (1) is estimated in the first step for the two waves. Then, only for the subsample d 2 = d 1 = 1, I do a regression of ∆y on ∆x andλ to estimate the parameters of interest.
Results for the bivariate probit are not reported. However, estimations of the correlation coefficient turned out to be equal to 0.132 and significant at 5% level. Table ( 13) and (14) reports the second stage results for small firm and high-tech firms respectively where standard errors have been corrected in oder to take into account first stage estimation. 10 Though this estimator drastically reduces the number of available observations in the second step, these regressions are useful to make comparisons with the cross-sections analysis conducted in the previous section.
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For high-tech firms variables representing relationship lending turned out to be positive and jointly significant at 10% level, suggesting that relationship banks do play a role for high-tech firms in the introduction phase as well. As the cross-section analysis suggested, for small firms relationship 10 For the asympotithic distribution and variance of this estimator see Rochina-Barrachina (1999) and Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007) . 11 In any case, even in small sample, this estimator is less biased than estimator ignoring correction for sample selection. Monte Carlo analysis also showed that is estimator is 1. robust to violation of conditional exchangeability (that is, sample selection varying over time), 2. free from misspecification affecting the individual effects in both equations, 3.robust to correlation among variables over time, 4. and robust to violiation of the normality assumption (Rochina-Barrachina (1999)).
banks play an important role in the introduction phase. In particular, this regression confirms the importance of the share of the main bank, which is again positive and significant. In addition, and also in line with the cross-section analysis, the competition index turned out to be negative and significant at 5% level, suggesting that more concentrated banking market may not be favourable to innovation.
Conclusions
Using data on sample of Italian manufacturing firms, this study investigated the effects of relationship lending on firm innovativeness, disentangling the impact of bank ties on the discovery phase from that in the introduction phase and adoption of new technologies. As Schumpeter argued in his earliest writing on the microeconomics of innovation (Schumpeter (1934 (Schumpeter ( , 1939 , O' Sullivan (2004)), banks are pivotal players in the innovation process and play a central role in real-sector innovation, not merely as a conduit for the movement of capital funds from savers to entrepreneurs.
In Italy, in particular, relationship lending has always been a way to channel funds to productive investments, since both the stock market and specialized financiers have played a marginal role.
However, despite the current richness of enterprise-based survey on innovative activity, there is still little in the extant micro-economic literature about the different role of the various sources of funding in the introduction and invention of new technologies. On the contrary, at a macro-level, there is a lively debate on the role of financial architecture (bank-based versus market-based) in fostering innovation and technology.
Results from the present micro-econometric analysis suggest that for small firms banks do not carry out an intervention at the development stage of the innovation. Similarly to what found in other analysis, Italian banks appear to play their traditional role in financing investments of otherwise financially constrained firms. In addition, the econometric analysis suggests that small firms in more concentrated banking market are associated with a lower innovative capacity. Results also indicate that longer relationship with the main bank can have negative effects on firm capacity to innovate for low-tech firms. The length of the relationship also exhibits negative and significant effects on the probability of introducing an innovation in those sectors that are more in need of external finance. On the contrary, relationship banks turned out to play an important role in both the discovery and introduction phases for firms in high-tech sectors. In that case, a higher share and a longer relationship with the main lending bank have a positive impact on the capacity of high-tech firms to innovate.
A APPENDIX I
In this section the variables used in the regressions are described. They are obtained from the 8th and 9th survey on Italian manufacturing firms carried out by Capitalia every three years. Note: Regressions include dummies for area and sectors Note: Regressions include dummies for area and sectors (1) and (2) refer to estimations of column (1) and (2) in table (9) respectively. Column (2') reports marginal effects for firms that do neither R&D nor fixed capital investments.
INNOVATION
(1) 
